West PH Sea: When diplomatic protests vs China fail

MANILA, Philippines—Despite over 590 diplomatic protests filed in almost 10 years, it seems that no amount of diplomacy is working to prevent China from its aggression in the South China Sea, especially in areas where the Philippines has exclusive sovereign rights.

This was pointed out by analyst Elaine Tolentino, former chairperson of the Department of International Studies at the De La Salle University (DLSU), who stressed that “[China] does it simply because it can.”

She told INQUIRER.net that given its military capacity, China’s bullying strategies have worked to further its expansionist goals without actually going to war, so the Philippines has to think how it would deal with China’s aggression.

While she said “diplomacy and dialogue are still necessary tools to avert a misstep,” the Philippines “should creatively find ways to impose actual costs on China that would question its power illusion that it is, at the moment, uncontested in its grey zone tactics.”

Based on data from the Department of Foreign Affairs, the government has already filed 591 diplomatic protests against China since 2016, the year when an arbitration decision invalidated China’s claims in most of the South China Sea.

‘China acts based on risks’

Geopolitical analyst Don McLain Gill said “when we talk about having a diplomatic solution” to the issue with China, “this does not mean that we will be letting go of our capacity to defend ourselves based on international law, based on our interest as a sovereign state.”

“We have to understand that China responds based on risks, based on threat, and if we do not pose the right amount of risk or threat [...] then it is likely to continue what it is doing through its salami slicing strategy,” he told INQUIRER.net.

Gill said “we’ve seen this.”

Based on a book written by former Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, before World War II, China’s southernmost defense perimeter was Hainan Island and that it did not have a single soldier stationed on any island in the South China Sea.

Since the late 1980s, however, China has seized Fiery Cross or Kagitingan Reef and Subi or Zamora Reef. It seized Mischief or Panganiban Reef in 1995, explaining that the stilt structures it erected were only shelters for its fishermen.

China’s presence in WPS

Carpio’s book, “The South China Sea Dispute: Philippine Sovereign Rights and Jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea,” stated that China already reclaimed seven reefs in the Spratlys—five high-tide and two low-tide elevations:

• Johnson South or Mabini Reef, a high-tide elevation located 184.7 NM, or nautical miles, from Palawan and 570.8 NM from China’s baseline point 39, which is Dongzhou (2). It is within the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Philippines.


• Hughes or McKennan Reef, a high-tide elevation located 181.3 NM from Palawan and 566.8 NM from China’s baseline point 39, which is Dongzhou (2), and is well within the Philippines’ EEZ.


• Cuarteron or Calderon Reef, a high-tide elevation outside the EEZ of the Philippines but within its extended continental shelf (ECS). It is located 245 NM from Palawan and 585.3 NM from China’s baseline point 39, which is Dongzhou (2).


• Fiery Cross or Kagitingan Reef, a rock that is about 0.6 meter above water at high tide that is outside the Philippines’ EEZ but within its ECS. It is located 254.2 NM from Palawan and 547.7 NM from China’s baseline point 39, which is Dongzhou (2).


• Gaven or Burgos Reef, a high-tide elevation that is outside the EEZ of the Philippines but within its ECS. It is located 203 NM from Palawan and 544.1 NM from China’s baseline point 39, which is Dongzhou (2).


• Mischief or Panganiban Reef, a low-tide elevation located 125.4 NM from Palawan and 598.1 NM from China’s baseline point 39, which is Dongzhou (2). It is well within the Philippines’ EEZ.


• Subi or Zamora Reef, a low-tide elevation within the territorial sea of Thitu or Pagasa Island, which is occupied by the Philippines. It is located 231.9 NM from Palawan and 502.2 NM from China’s baseline point 39, which is Dongzhou (2).

The number of Chinese outposts in the Spratlys as noted in Carpio's 2017 book still stands at seven, according to data from the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.

Reclamations

Based on data from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Philippine Navy, China already reclaimed 3,000 hectares inside and outside of the EEZ of the Philippines as of 2024 through dredging and island-building activities.

This was hit by the Philippine government as “creeping invasion,” but China insisted that most, or 85.7 percent, of the South China Sea is enclosed within its nine, now 10-dash line, which was already declared baseless and illegal.

Fiery Cross or Kagitingan Reef is now a 270-hectare island with a military airbase and three-kilometer military grade runway and a seaport, while Subi or Zamora Reef now has a 395-hectare artificial island.

China, as well, created a 394-hectare artificial island on Mischief or Panganiban Reef. It has an air-and-naval base with a three-kilometer military grade runway even when based on international law, only the Philippines can erect structures on the reef.

Maxar, a US-based space technology company, provided INQUIRER.net with old and latest satellite images of some reefs in the Spratlys, which has been reclaimed by China over the years.

Duterte’s silence

As stressed by Gill, the silence of the government throughout most of the six-year presidency of Rodrigo Duterte “emboldened China to do more against our interests in the West Philippine Sea.

It was on July 12, 2016, the first few days of Duterte in Malacañang, when the Philippines won in the arbitration case it filed against China, but it was only in 2021 and 2022 when the government started filing a lot of diplomatic protests in a year.

“What we are seeing now is the unraveling, untangling of those previous mistakes, and it would take time, consistency, and continuity from our part [to correct those mistakes], Gill pointed out.

The only way to make China go back to the negotiating table, he said, is to make it fully realize the consequence or risks arising from its actions.

“But this does not mean that we are war-mongers [as] we only have to recognize that we have to do a little bit more to ensure that equitable diplomacy is prioritized.”

This, as “China often likes to throw its weight around, and given that we are the less-powerful state and China just wants to exploit that vulnerability,” he said.

“We have to continue what we are doing, not just in terms of maintaining a rules-based approach, but enhancing our physical deterrence, our sea denial capabilities with our partners and our treaty ally, but also bolstering our national efforts in line with the archipelagic defense concept,” he said.

(2025/03/14-07:20)